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On April 26, 1986, a chemical explosion occurred at the
Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the former Soviet Union,
resulting in nuclear contamination on a global scale. It came
as a considerable shock to the world that an accident in a
nuclear power plant could have significant effects thousands of
miles away. Although other nuclear power accidents had oc-
curred prior to Chernobyl, the damage had largely been con-
fined to limited areas. At Windscale, for example, a fire in 'the
plutonium reactor spewed radioactive iodine into the air near
the Irish Sea for three days.' All of the resulting damage was
confined to the general area surrounding the reactor. 2 At Three
Mile Island, a partial nuclear meltdown occurred.3 Once again,
however, the scale of the accident was minimal and the damage
was limited to the immediate area. The Chernobyl incident is
unique because it was the first nuclear accident in which radi-
oactivity damage crossed transnational boundaries.4
In relation to Chernobyl, the former Soviet Union did not
provide immediate information to other states that could po-
tentially be affected by the nuclear incident, and it has not paid
compensation for any of the damage which other states claim
to have suffered as a result of the accident. The former Soviet
Union's failure to notify other states immediately and its refusal
to compensate for damages were not in violation of any inter-
* Editor, HARVARD LAW REVIEW; J.D., 1994, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1991,
Yale College. I would like to thank Andrew Willard, Yale Law School.
I See Stark Fallout from Chernobyl, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., May 12, 1986,
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national agreement to which it was a party.' This inaction was
problematic for the international community, given the severity
of the transboundary radiological consequences. Chernobyl il-
lustrates both the danger of "global disasters" which will in-
evitably arise as a consequence of large-scale industrial activity
and the normative expectations regarding the mitigation and
reparation of accidental transboundary nuclear harm.
The international reaction to the Soviet management of the
Chernobyl crisis provides a clarification of normative expecta-
tions regarding acceptable responses to nuclear accidents with
transnational consequences. As shown in this essay, the incident
reveals two established norms: (1) a state has a duty to warn
other states in a timely fashion of any nuclear accident that
may endanger their territory or residents; and (2) a state has a
duty to compensate for injury to other states caused by nuclear
mishap.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
The accident at Chernobyl's number four reactor occurred
during an experiment designed to determine how long the re-
actor would continue to produce electricity in the event of an
unexpected power cutoff.6 According to Soviet officials, a series
of explosions occurred, probably touched off by a malfunc-
tioning turbine and electrical failure. 7 The resulting fire spread
to equipment and then to the reactor itself.' The explosion blew
the top off the reactor and then spread a cloud of radioactive
At the time of the Chernobyl accident there existed no multilateral treaty
requiring the provision of prompt and detailed information, either for general air-carried
pollution or specifically for radioactive materials. See PETER H. SAND, CHERNOBYL: LAW
AND COoMNICATION xviii-xix (1988). No applicable treaty to which the former Soviet
Union was a party expressly provided for liability for transboundary environmental
damage. The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for
signature May 21, 1963, IAEA Doc. CN-12/46, creates absolute liability for operators
of nuclear plants that cause transboundary harm, but the former Soviet Union was not
a party that convention. The former Soviet Union was a party to the Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. 10, 541, 18 I.L.M.
1442. All Eastern European states, as well as members of the Common Market, had
signed the convention, but that agreement did not obligate states to compensate for
injuries resulting from transboundary air pollution.
'Anatomy of a Catastrophe, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1986, at 26.
See What Happened at Reactor Four, 43 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 26-31 (1986).




residue across the former Soviet Union, as well as across much
of Europe. 9 The radiation from Chernobyl, which initially swept
over Norway, Finland, and Sweden on April 28, was brought
into the heart of Europe by shifting winds on May 5, 1986.10
On April 28, 1986, workers set off radiation alarms as they
entered Sweden's Forsmark nuclear power plant." Later that
day Swedish Energy Minister Briggita Dahl still had no infor-
mation as to the source of the fallout, although experts con-
cluded that an accident had probably occurred in the former
Soviet Union twenty-four hours earlier." Some seventy-two
hours after.the accident had occurred, the Soviet Representative
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finally
informed the Director General of the IAEA, Hans Blix, that
an accident had occurred at 1:23 a.m. on April 26.11 It was not
until May 10, 1986, that officials of the former Soviet Union
notified the world that a major accident had taken place at its
Chernobyl plant. 4 The Soviet Union also did not publish details
for dissemination in its own country regarding Chernobyl until
that time.15
The full effect of the accident on people, property, and the
environment are still difficult to assess. In the former Soviet
Union, thirty-one people died as a direct result of the incident
within a few weeks, and three more died during 1987.16 Over
two hundred people were seriously injured.' 7 One hundred and
9 See id. Among the nations directly affected by the radioactive waste released by
the Chernobyl accident were the Netherlands, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switz-
erland, Poland, and Hungary. It is estimated that the amount of radiation detected in
Sweden was fifteen times the normal amount, four times greater in Switzerland, and
twice as great in Italy. Nations affected economically by contaminated food included
Canada, West Germany, and many other countries who imported food from the former
Soviet Union. See Ruby Abramson, Soviets Put Out Fire on Sub, Tow It Northeast;
Weinberger Says Blast on Nuclear-Armed Craft Killed More Than 3; No Radiation
Indicated, L.A. Tnsss, Oct. 6, 1986, at 12.
1* See Gerald M. Boyd, Reagan Home from the Tokyo Meeting, Is Jubilant, N.Y.
Tims, May 8, 1986, at A6.
" See Swedish Plant Detected Soviet Fallout; Stockholm Angry at Lack of Warn-
ing, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1986, at A14.
See id.
" See SAND, supra note 5, at 2.
4 See Soviet Nuclear Reactor Accident at Chernobyl, 86 DEPT. ST. Butt. No.
2112, 71, 73 (1986).
11 See Philip Taubman, Soviet Warns of Risks to Health, N.Y. TnAss, May 11,
1986, at AI.
16 See SAND, supra note 5, at 2.
17 See Chernobyl's Goal, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1986, at 33.
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thirty-five thousand people, some living as far as one hundred
miles from the Chernobyl plant, were evacuated from the area. 8
Scientists are now concerned with the long-term effects of the
accident, which may include tens of thousands of cancer
deaths.' 9 In the former Soviet Union, an area approximately
the size of Rhode Island is believed to have been contami-
nated. 20 Outside of that country, European farmers sustained
millions of dollars of damage from crops, livestock, and dairy
and egg products which could not be sold as a result of poten-
tial or actual contamination.2 The total loss is estimated to
run into hundreds of millions of dollars.22
II. CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF LAWFULNESS
The Chernobyl incident suggests that elites in the former
Soviet Union and in Western Europe differed in their expec-
tations as to how states involved in nuclear accidents should
behave. These divergent expectations related to the interpreta-
tion and authority of two normative expectations: (1) the duty
to inform other states of an actual or potential transborder
release of radioactive material; and (2) the duty to compensate
for damage caused to other states by a nuclear accident.
A. The Duty to Inform
1. Comparison of KAL 007 and Chernobyl
On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight num-
ber KE 007 was shot down by a Soviet fighter when it pene-
trated restricted Soviet airspace over a military base located on
8 See Chernobyl: The Soviet Report, NUCLEAR NEWS SPECIAL REPORT, Sept. !1,
1986, at I.
,1 The estimates of expected cancer deaths range from five to forty thousand for
the former Soviet Union and from two to six thousand for elsewhere in Europe.
I See Stark Fallout from Chernobyl, supra note 1, at 18. Chernobyl is located
about 80 miles from Kiev in the heart of the Soviet wheat land. Approximately 47%/o of
the former Soviet Union's winter wheat was grown there, id. at 19.
1, See Jackson Diehl, Chernobyl's Other Losses; In Eastern Europe Farmers Bear
Brunt, WASH. PosT, June 8, 1986, at Al.
U See Robert Gillett, 2 Pacts Approved to Handle Nuclear Accidents; One Calls
for Prompt Disaster Disclosure, the Other for Swift Emergency Aid, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1986, at 4 [hereinafter Pacts].
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Sakhalin Island.23 Both the shooting down of KAL 007 and the
Chernobyl nuclear disaster engaged the post-Brezhnev Soviet
leadership in unforeseen crises with serious international reper-
cussions. Although there were significant differences between
the two episodes-above all, the fact that the downing of KAL
007 had no direct consequences for the Soviet population-a
comparison of the way in which the two events were handled
offers a revealing look at persistent characteristics of Soviet
organizational behavior, as well as evidence of departures from
earlier practices .14
In both the KAL 007 shooting and the Chernobyl accident,
the Soviet leadership took immediate measures to deal with the
crisis at hand, while at the same time launching an internal
investigation to provide itself with a complete and accurate
account of the episode. 2 However,the leadership's initial public
reaction to both events was an official silence and even a denial.
The first Soviet mention of the KAL 007 airliner was a Tass
dispatch that simply reported its disappearance, 26 while in the
case of the Chernobyl disaster, the official reticence continued
for almost a full week.
During the first twenty-four hours after the disappearance
of KAL 007, Soviet diplomats in Washington and Moscow
professed to have no knowledge of the plane's fate, while the
Soviet ambassador to Japan called reports that the plane might
have been shot down by Soviet aircraft an "unfriendly com-
ment." '2 7 Even after the U.S. Secretary of State formally an-
nounced that the plane had been shot down by Soviet aircraft,
Soviet statements continued to imply innocence and deny any
responsibility for the fate of the missing aircraft, while at the
" See TASS Statement on Incident, N.Y. Tiams, Sept. 2, 1983, at A4; see generally
ALEXANDER DALLiN, BLACK Box: KAL 007 AND THE SupERPOWESs (1986) (accounting
the downing of KAL 007 and the Soviet handling of it).
'4 It should be noted that in neither of the two episodes did the Soviet government
accept any financial responsibility, or offer any compensation for the losses incurred as
a result of its actions. We will, however, examine the KAL shooting only with respect
to the notification norm. This is because the damage claims in the two incidents differ
greatly in extent and nature, while the comparison of the initial Soviet management can
indicate consistency, as well as change, in the Soviet regard for information.
For a useful account of the initial sequences of responses to the Chernobyl
accident, see DAVID R. MAPLESS, CsnaEOnYL AND NucLEA POWER N THE USSR 1-35
(1986).
' See DALuN, supra note 23, at 2.
, See id. at 3.
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same time arguing that its intrusion into Soviet airspace had
been a premeditated act in furtherance of an intelligence mis-
sion. It was not until a full week after the episode-when U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, played
tapes of the Soviet intercepts to the United Nations Security
Council-that Soviet United Nations delegate Oleg Troyanov-
sky finally acknowledged the fact that the jet had indeed been
downed by Soviet aircraft."'
The initial Soviet response to the Chernobyl disaster re-
flected a strikingly similar pattern. The first reference to the
disaster was a Tass statement carried on Radio Moscow forty-
eight hours after the event, and four full days elapsed from
the time of the initial explosions at the reactor before it was
reported in the Soviet press on April 30 that "an accident ha[d]
occurred at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station" and that
"measures [were] being taken to eliminate the consequences of
the accident." 29 Indeed, even as massive evacuations of resi-
dents were taking place, some Soviet officials were alleging that
the reported radiation came from Western nuclear tests, and
one diplomat defended the failure of Soviet authorities to in-
form neighboring states promptly by suggesting that "the gov-
ernments of proper countries are usually on holidays during
weekends." 30 Yet another six days elapsed before a full press
conference was devoted to the event.
3 1
2. Claims by Affected States
The affected states, consisting of the European countries,
argued that the former Soviet Union was obligated to provide
them with immediate information regarding the Chernobyl ac-
cident. 2 The failure of that country to notify these states
" See id. at 13.
Izv sTrYA, Apr. 30, 1986 reprinted in CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, May 21, 1986,
at I. Even these terse initial statements were not carried in full by the Ukrainian press.
The references to the victims as well as to the creation of an investigating commission
were deleted, id.
E. Pozdynayakov on ABC Nightline, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1986, at 19.
" See MAPPLEs, supra note 25, at 18.
32 Following the Chernobyl accident many states maintained that the obligation to
provide emergency information was a rule of international law. Much of the criticism
of the Soviet failure to provide information immediately after the accident was couched
in legal terms. See, e.g., Statement of the U.S. Secretary of State: "When an incident
has cross border implications, there is an obligation under international law to inform
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promptly prevented European governments from being pre-
pared to deal with the harmful effects of the radioactive fallout.
Delay in notification resulted in the contamination of foods,
radiation sickness, and worldwide hysteria.33
However, what the outside world perceived as extraordinary
ineptness, if not outright duplicity, in the Soviet handling of
the Chernobyl accident, in fact, reflected, when considered
together with the KAL 007 episode, a characteristic Soviet set
of priorities. Evidently, the first concern of the Soviet leader-
ship was with managing the domestic rather than the interna-
tional reaction and with maintaining its credibility and image
of infallibility with its own population in the face of these
threatening critical events.
Yet, there seems to have been essential agreement between
all parties regarding the importance of early notification in the
event of nuclear accidents with possible transboundary conse-
quences. This concurrence is evident from the former Soviet
Union's actions once it realized the political damage caused by
the seventy-two hour vacuum of information. In a joint com-
munique following the visit by an IAEA delegation to the
former Soviet Union in early May 1986, that country stated its
willingness to provide information on the accident as it became
available and undertook to provide the IAEA with daily infor-
mation on radiation levels at a number of meteorological sta-
tions located close to the Chernobyl plant.34 Furthermore, in a
message to the Secretary General of the United Nations on
June 3, 1986, Gorbachev referred to the need for "a system of
prompt notification in the event of accidents and malfunctions
at atomic power plants when such occurrences are accomplished
by the release of radiation." 35 Thus, the Soviet leadership im-
plicitly acknowledged its inadequate handling of the interna-
others and do it promptly." Deadly Meltdown, TmE, May 12, 1986, at 43. See also
Statement of the Group of Seven at the Tokyo Summit, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1005.
"Each country . . . is responsible for prompt provision of detailed and complete infor-
mation on nuclear emergencies and accidents, in particular those with potential trans-
boundary consequences. Each of our countries accepts that responsibility . See
infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text on the Tokyo Summit.
11 See Stuart Diamond, Chernobyl Causing Big Revisions in Global Nuclear Power
Policies, N.Y. TXmes, Oct. 27, 1986, at Al.
' See The Soviet Union and the Development of Nuclear Powers, 28 IAEA BULL.
8 (1986).
" Elaine Sciotino, Gorbachev Favors Atom Safety Code, N.Y. Timrs, June 4,
1986, at A12.
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tional aspects of the episode. Similarly, when a Soviet submarine
carrying nuclear weapons sank off the coast of Bermuda, the
former Soviet Union immediately notified the United States,
on October 4, 1986, in accordance with the norm of quick
response when its credibility was at stake.36 The former Soviet
Union also was the first state to ratify the Convention on Early
Notification of a Nuclear Accident in response to the Chernobyl
situation.37
Hence, unlike the KAL 007 shooting, the initial silence
involved in the Chernobyl incident was followed by a steady
and fairly detailed flow of information from the former Soviet
Union, as well as an expressed willingness to improve the
system of international notification. This difference suggests
that while there may have been an international conflict re-
garding priorities-that is, the former Soviet Union was pri-
marily concerned with managing its domestic image rather than
the international reaction and consequences, while the victim
states considered the international concern to take first prior-
ity-in the Chernobyl accident, there was agreement on the
norms of early warning in the event of nuclear accidents with
potential transboundary effects.
B. The Duty to Compensate
The former Soviet Union refused to pay any compensation
for the Chernobyl incident . 3  The country's a priori rejection
of possible claims for compensation implied that it viewed such
claims as inappropriate in light of the extent and nature of the
calamity suffered by the source state. 39 Thus, the Soviets sought
See Moscow's New Policy Reflected in Sub Report, N.Y. Timms. Oct. 5, 1986,
at A14; Death on a Soviet Sub, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 13, 1986, at 51 "The [United States)
State Department commended the Kremlin for its 'quick notification' of the incident
and offered U.S. assistance, which the Soviets so far have not accepted." Id.
17 See SAND, supra note 5, at 49.
31 See Robert Gillette, Soviets Ready to Discuss Liability Pact for Nuclear Mishaps;
Moscow Won't Compensate West for Chernobyl But Will Consider Question for Future,
L.A. Timas, Oct. 6, 1986, at 12 [hereinafter Liability Pact for Nuclear Mishaps].
19 Expressions of Soviet anger appear to have reflected, at least in part, the view
that informal Western demands for compensation constituted an illegitimate political
and economic exploitation of the disaster in the former Soviet Union. See, e.g., European
Ban on Flood Imports Viewed as Cynical Scheme to Boost Own Economies, PRAVDA,
May 18, 1986, at 4, reprinted in CURRENT Dic. Soy. PRESS, July 9, 1986, at 16 (claiming
that Western precautions regarding Soviet food imports reveal a plan to "damage" the
Soviet economy, and rejecting informal compensation demands on that basis).
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to reject the principle that a source state is fully accountable
for transboundary harm and chose instead to pursue an ideal
of international solidarity: exercising cost sharing between source
state and victim state in the context of catastrophic nuclear
accidents .40
In contrast, affected states did not accept the principle of
international solidarity in the case of nuclear accidents with
transnational consequences. In the wake of the former Soviet
Union's refusal to consider compensation payments, several
countries felt compelled to reemphasize the basic applicability
of the "polluter pays" principle to accidental transboundary
nuclear harm. 4' These states, thus, rejected the former Soviet
Union's implied "victim pays" philosophy which entailed the
notion that victim states should bear, or at least share the
costs, as a conceptual framework for allocating nuclear dam-
ages between source and victim states.
Furthermore, the former Soviet Union claimed that Western
nations instigated most of the problems by instituting "unnec-
essary" radioactive monitoring and food restrictions .4 That is,
damages abroad resulted from actions taken by authorities
overanxious to protect their populations against overestimated
long-term risks of radiation exposure. These damages, Soviet
sources maintained, could not qualify as internationally com-
pensable costs of the reactor accident. 43 Some European states,
however, in threatening the former Soviet Union with claims
for reparation, implied that even if it were determined that the
fallout from Chernobyl caused no measurable damage in the
environment, the cleanup costs associated with the efforts of
states to mitigate possible anticipated damage could be treated
as a form of indirect or consequential damages which should
, For an exposition of the principle that a source state is fully accountable for
transboundary nuclear pollution, see Gunther Handl, National Uses of Transboundary
Air Resources: The International Entitlement Issue Reconsidered, 26 NAT. RsouRcEs
J. 405 (1986).
• For example, Walter Wallmann, West German Minister for the Environment
and Nuclear Safety, stated that "the principle that the 'polluter pays' must be applied
when compensation for damages is sought. Financial responsibility for trans-border
damages must be borne by the country that causes an accident." Toward Nuclear Safety,
N.Y. T s, Nov. 7, 1986, at A35.
,1 See Pacts, supra note 22.
43 See id.
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be compensated." This norm, that costs incurred for preven-
tative or mitigative measures taken by a state that is the victim
of significant transboundary pollution should be reimbursed,
appears to have been vindicated in the Cosmos 954 satellite
crash.
1. Comparison of Cosmos 954 and Chernobyl
In the winter of 1978, Cosmos 954, a nuclear powered
Soviet satellite, plunged through the earth's atmosphere, crashed
in Canada, and strewed radioactive material across the tundra. 45
After months of environmental cleanup efforts, the Canadian
government presented the former Soviet Union with a bill of
$6 million." After initially refusing to pay, the former Soviet
Union later entered into negotiations with Canada, and even-
tually agreed to pay three million Canadian dollars as damages
for the injury caused by the Cosmos 954 accident.4 7 This pay-
ment was made even though the Canadian government had
conducted its extensive cleanup effort with the distinct possi-
bility that no actual measurable damage had occurred.
Thus, the Canadian-Soviet agreement settling Canada's claim
for damages in the Cosmos 954 incident seems to support a
norm of compensating for the efforts of states to prevent or
mitigate anticipated damage. However, even though the Soviets
partly reimbursed the Canadians for their cleanup costs after
the satellite crash, this approach was not adopted in the Cher-
nobyl situation. Therefore, the former Soviet Union, in its
refusal to compensate for Chernobyl damages, implied that
there is a distinction between transboundary pollution resulting
from nuclear accidents and that resulting from accidents such
as satellite crashes.
- Swedish officials studied the possibility of suing Moscow for damages to their
farmers but said it was unlikely they could do so. See REUTERs NORTH EUROPEAN SERV.,
May 23, 1986, (AM cycle). The West German government demanded that the Soviet
Union pay damages to West German farmers, id. Farmers in Northern England asked
for compensation for lambs that could not be slaughtered and sold. See REUTERs NoRam
EUROPEAN SERV., June 30, 1986, (AM cycle). Damages resulting from preventive meas-
ures taken thus were central to threats of litigation.
41 See Eilene Galloway, Nuclear Pwered Satellites: The U.S.S.R. Cosmos 954 and
the Canadian Claim, 12 AKRON L. REv. 401, 401 (1979).
See id. at 413.
See Liability Pact for Nuclear Mishaps, supra note 38. The Soviets paid $3
million to Canada "in full and final settlement of all matters connected with the
disintegration of the Soviet satellite 'Cosmos 954' in January 1978." Id.
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There are a number of possible reasons for the former
Soviet Union's refusal to follow the practice used in the Cosmos
954 crash. One such reason has to do with the much greater
damage inflicted upon the world by a nuclear accident of this
proportion. The total damage caused by Cosmos 954 was ap-
proximately $16 million.4 This amount pales in comparison to
the hundreds of millions of dollars of estimated damages which
have occurred as a result of the Chernobyl incident. 49 Addi-
tionally, the entire scope of the Chernobyl damage may not
become apparent for several years.3 0 Many health problems
caused by the radiation exposure, for example, do not manifest
for years. Accordingly, claims from a variety of parties, both
nations and individuals, will undoubtedly arise periodically over
the next ten to twenty years. To further complicate the com-
pensation process, the connection between health problems and
radiation exposure from Chernobyl will be attenuated and dif-
ficult to ascertain.
Another distinction between the Cosmos 954 incident and
that at Chernobyl is the Cosmos 954 incident involved physical
debris as well as radiation contamination. The damage was
confined to an easily identifiable area and enabled a fairly
accurate accounting of actual cleanup expenses. In contrast,
the Chernobyl damage was primarily radiation-oriented, and
damage caused by such radiation was spread over a large area
as a result of nuclear fallout. This could give rise to serious
questions on the part of the former Soviet Union as to what
, See Galloway, supra note 45, at 413.
49 See Pacts, supra note 22. Chernobyl might be compared with the Bhopal disaster.
On December 3, 1984, a large quantity of methyl isocynate gas escaped from a pesticide
plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India, killing more than 2000 people and injuring
perhaps as many as 200,000 others. In the Bhopal aftermath, there was a flurry of suits
brought on behalf of many victims, and Union Carbide expressed an interest in nego-
tiating, making a $200 million settlement offer (which was turned down by the Govern-
ment of India on April 5, 1985). See generally, Rajeev Dhavan, Note, For Whom? And
for What? Reflections on the Legal Aftermath of Bhopal, 20 TEx. INT'L. L.J. 285 (1985).
The settlement offer and the litigation suggest, first of all, a difference in the way
multinational enterprises, like Union Carbide, and states, like the former Soviet Union,
deal with enormous damage claims, and second, a difference in response to damage
claims based primarily on personal death or injury, as opposed to preventive or envi-
ronmental damages. This might explain why the Soviet government did not pay in the
Chernobyl incident, despite the fact that it was not the first industrial accident to involve
large damage claims.
" For an in-depth discussion of the effects of radiation poisoning in humans, see
Herbert L. Abrams, How Radiation Victims Suffer, 43 BuLL. ATOM. Sct. 13 (1986).
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claims for damages are actually legitimate. This problem was
evidenced by that country's insistence that claims for compen-
sation based on preventive and mitigative measures were not
supportable.
From the comparison of the former Soviet Union's actions
in the Cosmos 954 satellite crash with its actions in the Cher-
nobyl nuclear disaster, that country's implicit beliefs against
the responsibility of compensating for damage resulting from
Chernobyl are evident. In the context of catastrophic nuclear
accidents, where damage costs can be enormous and damage
claims can be more difficult to support, the norm of full
accountability is weakened. In contrast, the victim states claimed
that, while the damages involved in a nuclear accident like
Chernobyl are far greater than those caused by a falling space
orbit, this difference does not suggest the inapplicability of the
norm requiring compensation from the source state. Nor does
the uncertainty of the damages prevent recovery on the basis
of preventive and mitigative efforts taken by states in antici-
pation of radiation damages.
III. INTERNATIONAL APPRAISAL
The international reaction to the Soviet failure to provide
information immediately after the accident was swift and pro-
nounced. On May 1, 1986, the IAEA sent a telex to Soviet
authorities, urgently requesting further details of the accident."
The twelve member countries of the Common Market protested
the lack of notice and information.12 The West German Foreign
Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, said the former Soviet Union
should authorize visitation by the IAEA experts.53 Although
agency inspectors had visited Soviet nuclear power sites in the
past, the agency did not have the authority to order the Soviet
government to supply information about the accident:
4
The first important international reaction to the delayed
notification came on May 5, 1986, at the Tokyo Summit5 5,
11 See E. J. Dionne, Jr., Europe Demands All Soviet Details, N.Y. Twms, May 1,
1986, at Al.
11 See id. Bernard Gwertzman, Reactor Still Afire, U.S. Says; Soviet Reports
Danger Down; Europeans Denounce Secrecy, N.Y. Tirmas. May 1, 1986, at A12.
5, See Dionne, supra note 51.
See id.




where seven major industrial nations and the representatives of
the European Community issued a statement through the IAEA
56
calling for the former Soviet Union to acknowledge responsi-
bility for the accident and to cooperate immediately by provid-
ing the requested information.5 7 The Tokyo Summit nations5"
also expressed the need for an international agreement which
would require the reporting of nuclear emergencies with trans-
boundary consequences and the exchange of information during
such events,5 9 thus, implying intense dissatisfaction with the
Soviet handling of the crisis.
Prompt action was taken. On May 21, 1986, the Board of
Governors of the IAEA requested the Director General to
convene a group to draft two international agreements, one of
which would provide for early notification of nuclear acci-
dents.60 On July 21, 1986, a meeting began and by August 15,
1986, the group had reached a consensus on the text of the
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 6' which
was adopted on September 26, 1986.62 During the thirty days
before ratification, the Convention received an overwhelming
response, including fifty-eight signatories as of October 7, 1986.63
The purpose of the Convention was to minimize transboundary
radiological consequences through notification of an accident
to any neighboring state or to the IAEA.64 It applies to any
I The IAEA, which was established on July 29, 1957, is an independent intergov-
ernmental organization in the United Nations system. Its statutory objectives are: "jTIo
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity
throughout the world .. . land to] ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided
by it, or at its request or under its supervision or control, is not used in such a way as
to further any military purpose." Multilateral Statute of International Atomic Energy
Agency, opened for signature Oct. 26, 1956 - Jan. 24, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 1095 (entered
into force July 29, 1957). For a discussion of the activities of the IAEA generally and
in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, see generally Peter Riley, The Legal Control of
Nuclear Energy Between States, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 303 (1990-91).
" See Tokyo Summit Declaration on the Implications of the Chernobyl Nuclear
Accidents, INFCIRC/333, May 5, 1986, reprinted in International Organizations and
Agreements, 37 NucLEAR L. Btuu. 36, 38 (1986).
,1 The Tokyo Summit nations included Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy,
Japan, United States, and the Federal Republic of German. See Wallis, supra note 55.
" See Tokyo Summit Declaration on the Implications of the Chernobyl Nuclear
Accident, supra note 57, at 1 4.




" For a full explanation of the content and purpose of the convention, see
1992-931
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvm. L.
state party, persons or legal entities under a state's control or
jurisdiction, for any activity or facility "from which a release
of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and has
resulted or may result in an international transboundary release
that could be of radiological safety significance for another
State." 65
Regarding the issue of compensation, the international com-
munity's response to the environmental and economic damage
caused by the Chernobyl accident supports a norm of repara-
tion in the event of nuclear accidents with transboundary con-
sequences. Most elites emphasized the "polluter pays"
principle. 6 At least one Western observer, however, called for
a limit on Soviet liability "as a matter of practical politics and
common sense."' 67 He urged victim countries to absorb part of
their damage costs as an expression of international solidarity
in a world that utilizes nuclear power." Nevertheless, very few
elites supported the Soviet conception that full accountability
did not apply in the case of catastrophic nuclear accidents.
Perhaps with the realization of the political damage that
resulted from its refusal to make compensation payments, the
former Soviet Union suggested after the Chernobyl accident
that, although it had no legal obligation to compensate, a
multilateral agreement "could envisage the liability of states
for international damage." 69 However, any such agreement
would also have to assign liability for the "material, moral,
and political damage caused by unwarranted action taken under
the pretext of protection against the consequences of nuclear
accidents." 70 As of now, there has been no significant devel-
opment in this direction, but the former Soviet Union's state-
ment, while still stressing concern with illegitimate damage
ADRONICO 0. ADEDE, THE IAEA NOTIFICATION AND ASSISTANCE CONVENTIONS IN CASE
OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT (1987).
0 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Art. 1.1, opened for
signature Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1370 (1986) (entered into force Oct. 27, 1986).
See, e.g., Record of the Fourth Plenary Meeting, IAEA Doc. GC(SPL.[)/OR.1,
at 10, 137 (statement of the Swiss delegate); Record of the First Plenary Meeting, IAEA
Doc. GC(SPL.I)/ OR. 1, at 27-28, 64 (statement of the West German delegate); see also
Toward Nuclear Safety, supra note 41.
", Rubin, The Soviet Nuclear Disaster and the Law, 35 INT'L PRAC. NOTEBOOK 8,
9 (1986).
See id.




claims, implies that perhaps that country was more in agree-
ment with the compensation norm than was apparent.
IV. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The Chernobyl accident starkly illustrated the fact that
nuclear pollution does not respect the boundaries between sov-
ereign states. Until Chernobyl, the operation of national nu-
clear power reactors was generally considered a matter of
domestic concern, with neighboring states having a limited legal
interest. The accident undermined the viability of this view by
demonstrating that the risks of nuclear power operations are
intrinsically international in nature. This realization of the global
scale of states' environmental interdependence led to the No-
tification Convention and the Soviet proposal for the devel-
opment of the norms on liability. Nevertheless, questions remain
as to how fully the international community has absorbed the
lesson of interdependence in the nuclear world. Unfortunately,
it seems that states are inclined to attach importance to trans-
boundary environmental problems only when they themselves
suffer serious direct damaging impacts.
A. Information Dissemination
In examining the Soviets' attempt to control the flow of
information, the role of communication technologies cannot be
ignored.' Even before the Chernobyl crisis, technological ad-
vancement as well as human communication had begun to
undermine the insulation of the Soviet system and breach its
secrecy. It was the Swedish government, among others, that
recorded a sudden sharp rise in radiation levels and pressed the
Soviet authorities for an explanation.7 2 Indeed, Western tech-
nology played an essential role in providing information about
Chernobyl to the outside world; military as well as private
communications satellites passing high over Soviet territories
supplied detailed photographs of the damaged reactor. 73 It may
well be that the era in which a state can shut itself off from
" For a discussion of the role of communication technology in Chernobyl, see
SAND, supra note 5, at xvii-xviii.
"1 See Swedish Plant Detected Soviet Fallout; Stockholm Angry at Lack of Warn-
ing, WASH. POST, April 29, 1986, at A14.
" See SAND, supra note 5, at xvii.
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the rest of the world and fail to provide information on a
matter of global public concern is now past.
Regarding the Notification Convention, it can be said that
the broad consensus which supported the early warning stipu-
lations and the speed with which they were negotiated reflect
the fact that states are willing and able to act decisively when
their common interests are involved. However, the Convention
cannot be accepted unreservedly as an instrument for clarifying
norms. A close look at that document reveals some difficulties.
Article 5, Section 3 of the Convention is seriously flawed in
that it allows a notifying state to restrict the use of confidential
information: "Information received pursuant to sub-paragraph
(b) of Article 2 may be used without restriction, except when
such information is provided in confidence by the notifying
State Party. "
74
Although this provision may allow secrecy for reasons of
national interest or defense, in reality it undermines the Con-
vention's purpose in the most basic way by allowing a notifying
party to restrict another party's use of its information to the
detriment of the health and welfare of the receiving party's
citizens. By allowing a state to restrict the use of information
concerning a nuclear disaster within its borders, Article 5,
Section 3 abrogates the Convention's effectiveness as a means
of minimizing transboundary radiological consequences. In ef-
fect, the provision allows the state where the disaster occurs to
dictate the actions taken by neighboring victim states. The
presence of this section and the overwhelming support for the
Convention together imply that while states would acknowledge
the importance of the notification norm, they are still attached
to their bases of power and are, thus, hesitant to relinquish
complete control over information.
' Article 2, "Notification and information," states the following:
In the event of an accident specified in article I (hereinafter referred to as
"nuclear accident"), the State Party referred to in that article shall:
(a) forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic
Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency"), those States
which are or may be physically affected as specified in article I and the
Agency of the nuclear accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and
its exact location where appropriate; and
(b) promptly provide the States referred to in sub-paragraph (a),
directly or through the Agency, and the Agency with such available infor-
mation relevant to minimizing the radiological consequences in those States;
as specified in article 5."
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, supra note 65.
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Furthermore, the Convention's scope is limited to accidents
arising out of non-military facilities. 75 The five nuclear weapons
states declared that they would voluntarily apply the Conven-
tion to all nuclear accidents, irrespective of origin, 76 and on
October 6, 1986, shortly after the Notification Convention was
opened for signature, the former Soviet Union provided infor-
mation about an accident on board one of its nuclear-powered
submarines which might have radiological consequences. 77 Nev-
ertheless, both the United States and the former Soviet Union
seemed unwilling to report accidents at military nuclear plants
if disclosure would oblige them to reveal military secrets. 78 The
fact that military nuclear accidents are not covered in the
Convention again indicates that the norm regarding the provi-
sion of information is limited by the global community.
B. Compensation to Affected States
1. Claims Resulting from Chernobyl
Interestingly, none of the affected governments in Western
Europe formally lodged an international legal claim for damages
with the former Soviet Union.79 This may reinforce the impli-
cation that there was no international legal basis for securing
damages from the Soviet government. However, this failure
cannot be attributed solely to lack of a legal obligation for
compensation. Political expediency, for example, probably dis-
suaded affected governments from pursuing the issue of repa-
ration through diplomatic channels. Some Western European
governments appeared to be more concerned with securing Soviet
" See Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, supra note 65, at
Art. 1.
' See Statements of Voluntary Application of Early Notification Conventaion to
Accidents not Covered by the Convention, 25 I.L.M. 1394 (1986) (verbatim excerpts
from statements made at the IAEA Special Session adopting the Convention). The
statements were made pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention, which states that "State
Parties may notify in the event of nuclear accidents other than those specified" in the
Convention, id.
See Moscow's New Policy Reflected in Sub Report, supra note 36.
" See Paul Lewis, Military Reactors are Issue at Nuclear Parely in Vienna, N.Y.
Trmss, June 11, 1986, at A4; Paul Lewis, U.S. and Soviet Said to Try to Limit Fallout
Pact, N.Y. TIms, Aug. 14, 1986, at A1S.
" The Soviet Union was, however, faced with threats of litigation. See supra note
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cooperation in the long-term management of the risk of trans-
boundary nuclear accidents in Europe than with obtaining com-
pensation for economic loss ascribed to fallout from the stricken
Soviet reactor.80 These governments probably viewed insistence
on Soviet liability and compensation as prejudicing prospects for
future Soviet cooperation.
Similarly, it is quite possible that the "East-West factor"
played a role in discouraging victim states from pressing inter-
national claims against the former Soviet Union.', Inspired by
an analogy to the relations between developed and developing
countries, the "East-West factor" connotes the perception that
as between polluting Eastern European and polluting Western
European countries, states' traditional international entitlements
should be suspended. The underlying premise of this perception
is that economically superior victim states should contribute to
the costs of reducing transnationally harmful pollution and, in
the case of accidents, should bear, or at least share, the costs
of dealing with transboundary pollution.
2. Emerging Norms
The sensitivity of questions relating to the reparation of
transboundary nuclear harm is demonstrated by a distinct trend
in state practice to bypass the issue of liability and compensation
whenever possible. Reference to state liability is completely ab-
sent from the EC Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air-Pollution.8 2 International practice regarding the issue of li-
ability is relatively limited compared to international practice in
the areas of prevention and mitigation of transboundary physical
See e.g., Statement of Swedish Government, infra note 83; see also Affirmation
by Walter Waltman, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1986, at A35. The Eastern Bloc's political
sensitivity to the idea of compensatory claims is discussed in Chernobyl Creates New
Tightrope: Despite Economic Damage, Bloc Seeks Not to Offend Soviet, INT'L HERALD
Tam., June 9, 1986, at 1.
" There is evidence that such a "victim pays" philosophy influenced environmental
relations between Eastern and Western Europe. See generally Handl, supra note 40.
" See Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, supra note 5, at
1445. Article 8 provides that Contracting Parties shall exchange available information
on, inter alia, "(f) physico-chemical and biological data relating to the effects of long-
range transboundary air pollution and the extent of damage." To that provision is
appended a footnote which expressly provides: "The present Convention does not contain
a rule on State liability as to damage." Id.
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harm.83 The resulting scarcity of bilaterally accepted, clear-cut
standards upon which to build a multilateral legislative initiative
accentuates the political sensitivity of addressing the liability
issue multilaterally." Thus, although states generally agree on
the need to clarify the issue of reparation of transboundary
nuclear harm, they also urge that it be approached with caution
and deliberation.85 The desire to sidestep the issue of states'
international liability was present at the IAEA Board of Gov-
ernors meeting in February, 1987, where several countries op-
posed preparation of a convention on the international liability
of states on the grounds that it was "premature and unrealis-
tic. "86 These states also argued that any legislative initiative
aimed at launching such a convention would be too "complex
and potentially fraught with controversy" to be undertaken within
the Agency's framework.
8 7
For this reason, the Chernobyl accident revealed general
uncertainty within the international community as to the norms
governing a state's liability for the transboundary consequences
of nuclear accidents within its jurisdiction. A lack of clear prin-
ciples derives in part from the general reluctance of nations to
strengthen their international liability. This reluctance may be
due to the nature of the risks attendant on the operation of
"1 It is also true, however, that states give short shrift to the resolution of liability
issues because they tend to regard arrangements for the prevention and mitigation of
transboundary harm as taking priority over the settlement of liability issues. For example,
see Statement of the Swedish Government:
In terms of treaties there is no international agreement existing, whether
bilateral or multilateral, on the basis of which a Swedish claim for damages
against the USSR could be conceived.
Insofar as customary international law is concerned, principles exist
which might be invoked to support a claim against the USSR. The issues
involved, however, are complex from the legal as well as the technical
point of view and warrant careful consideration.
In the present circumstances, the Government has felt that priority
should be given, in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, to endeavors of
another nature.
SAND, supra note 5, at 27.
" For a discussion of limitations of various multilateral environmental agreements,
see Lynn Theresa Cahalan, Note, Compensating Private Parties for Transnational Pol-
lution Injury, 58 ST. Jon's L. Rv. 528, 540-51 (1984).
11 See Provisional Record of the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, JAEA Doc.
GOV/OR.667, at 8, 16 (statement of the Indian governor); and 11, 25 (statement of
the governor of the United States).
- Id. at 15, 39 (1987) (statement of the Japanese governor).
0 See, e.g., id. at 11, 25, 73 (statements of the governor from the United States).
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nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plants involve a very low
risk of failure but, as demonstrated by Chernobyl, the costs of
failure can be enormous. Even diligent state regulation of nuclear
activities may be unable to prevent serious accidents from oc-
curring. The widespread and long-lasting consequences of nu-
clear accidents, thus, may discourage the willingness of nuclear
power countries to define binding norms of state liability.
In addition, due to the relatively recent growth and spread
of nuclear activities and the fact that the major nuclear accidents
that occurred prior to Chernobyl created no serious international
repercussions, resolution of these issues has not been necessary.
However, given the widespread and increasing reliance on nu-
clear power plants, it is foolish to assume that future accidents
will not give rise to international damage claims. This fact,
together with the significance and irreversibility of nuclear re-
actor damage, which may make nuclear power states reluctant
to strengthen liability norms, should indicate the need for in-
creased certainty in the compensation norms involved in trans-
boundary nuclear harm.
The Soviet invocation of this international solidarity principle
is unpersuasive in the context of accidental transboundary nu-
clear harm. First and most obvious, while nuclear activities are
almost always controlled and supported by the operating state,
there are few or no beneficial externalities to neighboring states.
Second, the view that a major nuclear accident is the product
of nuclear technology that victimizes both the source state and
injured neighboring states while binding states together in a
community, correctly recognizes that the world is environmen-
tally interdependent. However, as a practical matter, cost sharing
is likely to prove unacceptable as the international ground rule
for allocating the transboundary costs of major nuclear accidents
in a world divided into nuclear and non-nuclear power countries,
hostile blocs and alliances. All of this accounts for the general
international rejection of the "victim pays" principle.
CONCLUSION
The Chernobyl accident exposed how traditional notions of
sovereignty and national boundaries have been transformed by
the modern technological and industrial world. The Notification
Convention, as the first multilateral agreement to provide a
detailed framework for the application of norms relating to the
provision of information in emergency situations, was an effort
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by states to meet the challenge of heightened interdependence.
However, the Convention's limited scope and its paragraph al-
lowing states to restrict the use of confidential information in-
dicate that the Convention is not an entirely adequate response
to the notification problem raised by the Chernobyl accident.
Similarly, states' unwillingness to address the norms govern-
ing reparation for nuclear accidents is problematic. If the osten-
sibly temporary deferment of the compensation issue portends a
continuation of the previous trend of altogether neglecting the
norms of states' international liability, then present multilateral
reform initiatives are seriously deficient. The reluctance of states
to strengthen both their international liability and their obliga-
tion to provide immediate and unrestricted information in the
case of all nuclear accidents negatively affects the authority of
the relevant norms. A recognition of the relationship between
environmental quality and human rights might impress upon
states the urgency of the crisis before the world community.
Only through a willingness to recognize the international dimen-
sion of nuclear hazards and an effort to make national rivalries
and insecurities secondary to the global interest will states be
able to strengthen the system of international cooperation
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